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We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse can-
didates and endorsements are observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election
outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though voters know the distribution of
expert interests and account for it when evaluating endorsements. Expert inuence is fully de-
centralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert inuence. The eect
arises when some agents prefer, ceteris paribus, to support the winning candidate and when
experts are much better informed about the state of the world than are voters.
1 Introduction
In the lead up to elections, many experts make public recommendations about which candidate
to vote for. Do the experts' interests inuence mass opinion and behavior? We show that expert
endorsements can have a large eect on election outcomes, biasing the results toward their own
interests. Our model features Bayesian voters who know the distribution of expert biases and a
large number of experts who have negligible individual inuence. The eect arises as a result of
herding multiplied through a coordination motive. We show that the total eect can be large even
if the direct herding eect small.
Well-informed agents convey recommendations to the general electorate through at least two
institutionalized channels. First, the media customarily publish editorials endorsing particular
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1political candidates. Second, campaign donors endorse candidates indirectly through political ad-
vertisements nanced from donations. We examine elites' inuence in a model in which rst each
expert endorses one candidate and then voters, each observing a random sample of endorsements,
elect a candidate by majority rule. The election outcome is biased toward experts' interests under
two assumptions: (i) experts are much more informed than are voters about the distribution of
preferences, and (ii) some experts and voters prefer, ceteris paribus, to support the winner of the
election.
Despite empirical evidence to the contrary,1 economic models of elections have typically as-
sumed that voters cannot be systematically manipulated by expert endorsements except insofar as
their beliefs about candidate type are aected. Indeed, systematic manipulation of decision makers
by experts' interests may appear to be at odds with rational choice. A Bayesian decision-maker
accounts for experts' biases when evaluating their advice, potentially osetting the experts' inu-
ence. For instance, in the cheap talk literature the bias of the informed agent typically results in a
limitation on credible communication rather than consistent manipulation of the principal.
In this paper we identify a novel channel through which experts' biases, despite being known,
inuence the election outcome. In our model, because some agents prefer to support the winner,
the election is a coordination game in which optimal actions depend on agents' beliefs about the
election outcome. There is a continuum of experts and voters, each of whom possesses private
information about the relative strength of the candidates (based on the number of partisan voters
on each side). As in the global games literature, private information ensures that there is a unique
equilibrium. In equilibrium, the election outcome is determined by the candidates' relative strength
and the agents' biases, enabling us to quantify the inuence of experts' preferences.
Each expert is assumed to have an intrinsic bias toward endorsing a particular candidate, which
she trades o against her preference for endorsing the winner. Since experts' beliefs are based on
their private information, endorsements provide information to voters about the future election
outcome, thereby inuencing those voters who also prefer to support the winner. The experts
become opinion leaders. Even though voters are aware of dierences between their own biases and
those of the experts, their beliefs about the winner are aected by the experts' biases, at least
1See Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987), Beck, Dalton, Greene, and Huckfeldt (2004), Druckman and Parkin
(2008), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), and Gabel and Scheve (2007).
2sometimes. While the beliefs of rational voters cannot be manipulated systematically, they can be
\fooled" in some contingencies. The set of contingencies in which the voters fail to lter out the
experts' biases turns out to be small, but these happen to be contingencies that are pivotal for the
equilibrium outcome.
Consider independent experts and independent voters whose biases are weak enough that, if
they were certain of who would win the election, they would prefer to support the winner. In
particular, if there is little doubt about who will win, the optimal actions of agents in these two
groups are aligned. An agent's optimal action depends on her bias only when she is uncertain
about the outcome. Since experts are well-informed, voters believe that each expert is likely to
be certain of the outcome. Hence voters eectively ignore experts' biases when evaluating their
endorsements. Consequently, in contingencies so close to a tie that experts are unsure of the
outcome, the distribution of endorsements is biased toward experts' interests, which in turn biases
the vote in the same direction.
Even though contingencies in which experts are uncertain are rare when experts are well in-
formed, strategic complementarities can multiply the eect so as to make the candidate preferred
by experts considerably more likely to win. Starting from an equilibrium of the simultaneous vot-
ing game without experts, introducing experts leads to more votes for their preferred candidate
in contingencies where the election would otherwise be very close. This in turn leads to more
endorsements of that candidate in other nearby contingencies, which generates more votes, and so
on, multiplying the eect. The size of the eect at each step vanishes as experts become very well
informed, but the total eect is generally non-vanishing.
We explicitly characterize the equilibrium of the game with experts and voters. The charac-
terization shows that the presence of experts generally aects the likelihood that each candidate
wins. The inuence of experts is monotone in the sense that, if experts' biases shift in favor of
one candidate, that candidate becomes more likely to win the election. Moreover, the inuence of
experts is large when voters observe many endorsements; we show that in the limit as the number
of observed endorsements tends to innity, the candidate preferred by the experts always wins
whenever partisan voters for the opposing candidate do not form a majority.
The key assumption that agents favor the winner of an election may hold for various reasons.
In the case of experts, endorsements are public, and can therefore aect relationships with the
3elected politician (for example through access). For voters, a preference for the winner may be
due to conformism as in Callander (2007) and Callander (2008).2 In elections to select a party
leader, conformism arises naturally from a desire to keep the party united for the general election.
Alternatively, a coordination motive may arise among voters in elections with multiple candidates
if a majority with preferences split between two similar candidates need to coordinate to defeat a
Condorcet loser (see Cox (1997), Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), and Myatt (2007)).
Aside from elections, our framework can be applied to many other economic settings that
naturally exhibit an incentive to \vote" for the winner. For example, in the adoption of technologies
with network externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1986), if potential adopters observe early choices of
a few well informed experts, then the model suggests that the equilibrium coordination outcome
disproportionately reects the experts' preferences. In particular, the price at which the good is
oered to early adopters can have a large impact on eventual adoption even if later buyers know
the past prices and market participants have good information about the quality of the good.
In addition, in line with the marketing literature (e.g. Watts and Dodds (2007)), opinion leaders
become natural marketing targets.
The view that rationality limits manipulation by experts has been common in the political
economy literature. Coate (2004) and Prat (2006) emphasize that rational voters can account
for the interests behind expensive political campaigns. In a similar vein, DellaVigna and Kaplan
(2007) interpret their empirical evidence of media impact as either a temporary phenomenon that
will disappear as biases are learned, or as a consequence of irrationality among voters. To the
extent that opinion manipulation has appeared in political economy modelling, it has generally been
assumed in an ad hoc form lacking explicit foundations (see, e.g., Shachar and Nalebu (1999),
Grossman and Helpman (2002), and Murphy and Shleifer (2004)). One exception is Ekmekci
(2009), who shows how a single expert with a known bias can manipulate an election by acting
as a coordination device among voters. In our model, experts cannot act as coordination devices
because each expert's endorsement is observed by a negligible fraction of voters.
The global games literature provides several insights on the role of social learning in coordination
processes. If social learning is public then the observation of early actions correlates the beliefs
2See Callander (2008) for a review of the literature. Callander traces the use of conformism in voting theory
back to Hinich (1981) and cites psychological literature beginning with Asch (1951) that documents conformism
empirically.
4of late movers. This correlation can lead to equilibrium multiplicity as in Angeletos, Hellwig,
and Pavan (2007), or to a disproportionate inuence of one large opinion leader as in Corsetti,
Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004). Social learning in our model is private, thereby preserving
the informational heterogeneity needed to ensure equilibrium uniqueness.3 Edmond (2007) studies
strategic information transmission between citizens and government with conicting preferences
and nds that the government can manipulate the actions of rational citizens. Both Corsetti,
Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) and Edmond (2007) study the inuence of one large player who
internalizes the impact of her action. In our model, the equilibrium reects the experts' interests
even though experts have negligible individual inuence.
2 Model
A continuum of voters elect candidate A or B by majority rule. Two thirds of voters are partisans
who always vote for their preferred candidate independent of others' actions. The remaining third
of voters are independent voters whose preferred candidate depends on their expectations about
the election outcome. Independent voters, indexed by i 2 [0;1=3], vote according to two possibly
conicting criteria: they have an intrinsic preference for one of the candidates but also prefer to
vote for the winner. Let ai 2 fA;Bg be the vote of independent voter i, let w 2 fA;Bg be the
winner of the election, and let bi
v be a parameter in ( 1;1) capturing the bias of independent voter
i with bi
v a measurable function of i. The payo to independent voter i is4
uv(ai;bi
v;w) = bi
v1 lai=A + 1 lai=w:
Independent voter i receives a premium of bi
v if she votes for candidate A and a premium of 1 if
she votes for the winner.
Let sA and sB be the measures of partisan voters supporting candidates A and B respectively,
with sA;sB 2 [0;2=3] and sA + sB = 2=3, and let  be the proportion of independent votes for
3See Dasgupta (2007) for the pioneering study of private social learning in global games.
4Note that only the dierence in payos between a voter's two actions is consequential for equilibrium actions. In
particular, since an individual voter has no eect on the electoral outcome, adding an additional term to the payos
that depends only on who wins the election would have no eect on equilibrium behavior.








Candidate A wins if the proportion of independent votes for A exceeds ; otherwise B wins.5 We
refer to  as the state. If  < 0 then more than half of all voters are partisans supporting candidate
A, and hence A wins regardless of the independent votes. Similarly, if  > 1 then candidate B
wins. We focus on the election outcome for  2 (0;1), where it depends on the independent voters'
actions. In this region, the preference to vote for the winner creates a coordination problem among
the independent voters. If, for  2 (0;1),  was common knowledge among the independent voters,
the game would have multiple equilibria with each candidate winning in some equilibrium.
Instead of complete information, voters receive private information about the state  consisting
of two parts: exogenous signals and endorsements from experts who have information about .
Before describing the details of the information structure, we introduce the experts' payos.
There is a continuum of experts. Each expert j casts an endorsement aj 2 fA;Bg in favor of
one of the two candidates. As in the case of the voters, one third of the experts are independents
and two thirds are partisans. For simplicity, we assume that partisan experts are equally divided
between the candidates: half of the partisan experts always endorse candidate A, while the other
half always endorse candidate B.6 The remaining third of experts are independent experts, indexed
by j 2 [0;1=3], whose optimal actions depend on their expectations about the election outcome.
Independent experts' payos are similar to those of independent voters. Let aj 2 fA;Bg be
the endorsement by independent expert j, and let b
j
e be a constant in ( 1;1) capturing the bias of
independent expert j with b
j
e a measurable function of j. The payo to independent expert j is
ue(aj;bj
e;w) = bj
e1 laj=A + 1 laj=w:
As for independent voters, independent expert j receives a premium of b
j
e if she endorses candidate
A and an additional premium of 1 if she endorses the winner.
5The tie-breaking rule is irrelevant since ties occur with zero probability.
6The assumption that partisan experts are equally divided between the two candidates can be relaxed. With a
dierent distribution, the signs of the comparative statics we study remain the same, but the magnitude of the eects
may dier.
6The information structure and timing are as follows. First, the state  is drawn from a uniform
distribution on [ 1=2;3=2]. Then each independent expert j receives a private signal xj = +j,
and each independent voter i receives a private signal zi =  + "i. The experts' errors j are
drawn from a continuous distribution F with support on [ 1=2;1=2] and density f, and the voters'
errors "i from a continuous distribution G with support on [ 1=4;1=4] and density g. Errors are
independent across players and independent of . The parameter , which is assumed to lie in the
interval (0;1=2], scales the noise in experts' signals. Our results focus on the limit as  tends to 0.
After the signals have been observed and before the election, experts simultaneously choose
endorsements aj. In addition to her private signal zi, each voter observes a random sample of n
endorsements, where, for simplicity, n 2 N is xed across voters. The sample is private and taken
with uniform probability over all experts, regardless of type. Voters do not observe the biases or
signals of the experts in their sample. After observing endorsements, the voters simultaneously
choose votes ai.
Let i 2 f0;:::;ng denote the number of endorsements of candidate A in voter i's sample. A
strategy for an independent expert maps each signal xj to an endorsement aj 2 fA;Bg. A strategy
for an independent voter maps each pair (zi;i) to a vote ai 2 fA;Bg. A strategy for an expert is
monotone if there is some threshold signal above which she endorses candidate B and below which
she endorses candidate A. A strategy si for a voter is monotone if (i) si(z;) = B implies that
si(z0;0) = B whenever z0  z and 0  , and (ii) si(z;) = A implies that si(z0;0) = A whenever
z0  z and 0  . We restrict attention to monotone strategies. All parameters of the model,
including biases, and all distributions are common knowledge.
3 Elections without Opinion Leaders
Before we solve the main model, we consider elections in which the voters do not observe the
experts' endorsements (in the notation of Section 2, n = 0). In this case, the election reduces to
a simultaneous move game among the independent voters. We derive a monotone Bayesian Nash
equilibrium with a pivotal state  such that candidate A wins for  <  and B wins for  > .
Given the threshold , let v(zi;) be the posterior belief that voter i assigns to candidate A








Independent voter i votes for candidate A if and only if her posterior belief v(zi;) exceeds a
critical probability pi
v, where pi
v solves the indierence condition
bi
v + pi






2 reects the independent voters' bias bi
v.
By the denition of the pivotal state , the election results in tie when  = . Since  is
dened to be equal to the share of independent votes leading to a tie,  must equal the share of






where i is a uniformly drawn independent voter. The following lemma allows us to use the preceding
condition to compute the pivotal state regardless of the distribution of noise in voters' signals.
Lemma 1. Posterior beliefs in the pivotal state  2 [0;1] are distributed uniformly on [0;1]
regardless of the noise distribution. Thus for any p 2 [0;1] and any i, we have
Pr
 
v(zi;) > p j 
= 1   p:
The uniform property of posterior beliefs in the lemma has been used in Guimaraes and Morris
(2007) and Steiner (2006). For convenience, we include the proof in the appendix.































where bv denotes the average bias among independent voters. The election outcome without expert
endorsements aggregates the preferences of voters in a natural way. Candidate A wins if she has
8sucient support among partisan voters and/or independent voters are suciently biased in her
favor. Moreover, the candidate preferred by independent voters is, ex ante, more likely to win the
election.
The channel through which the independent voters' bias bv aects the outcome is best under-
stood through the pivotal condition (1). The pivotal state  is determined by the best responses
of the independent voters in the pivotal state. In this state, the independent voters receive incon-
clusive signals making them unsure about the election outcome. Consequently, their individual
voting behavior is aected by their individual biases bi
v, and the aggregate vote is a function of the
average bias bv. The analysis in the next section, where voters observe expert endorsements, also
focuses on behavior in the pivotal state, where there is large strategic uncertainty. In the pivotal
state, the behavior of experts who are uncertain about the outcome of the election is aected by
their intrinsic biases and it turns out that voters do not lter out the experts' biases. As a result,
the experts' biases aect the equilibrium outcome.
4 Elections with Opinion Leaders
We now return to the model of Section 2 in which each voter observes a random sample of n > 0
expert endorsements. Since we do not use any other equilibrium concept, we write simply \equilib-
rium" to mean weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. As in the benchmark game, we restrict attention
to equilibria in monotone strategies.
As above, any monotone equilibrium gives rise to a pivotal state , such that candidate A
wins for  <  and candidate B wins for  > . The equilibrium analysis below has the same
structure as the analysis of the benchmark game. We take the value of  as given, compute the
best responses of both the experts and the voters to , and then use the requirement that in the
pivotal state the election results in a tie.
4.1 Experts' Behavior
We begin by considering the best responses of experts. Given the threshold , independent expert
j endorses candidate A if and only if her posterior belief e(xj;;) that  <  exceeds a critical
9probability pi
e. The critical probability again satises the indierence condition
bi
e + pi






2 reects the experts' bias bi
e.
Let l(;;) denote the probability that a randomly chosen expert endorses candidate A in














where j is a random independent expert.
The analysis of experts' behavior is particularly simple if the realized state  is suciently far
from the pivotal state  relative to the noise in the experts' signals. In that case, every independent






3 if  >  + ,
2
3 if  <    .
The analysis of the experts' behavior is also simple when the realized state  is exactly equal to the
pivotal state . By Lemma 1, experts' posterior beliefs are uniformly distributed on [0;1] in the
pivotal state . Therefore, the ex ante probability that independent expert i endorses candidate
A in state  is 1   pi
e. Combining this observation with (2) gives the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let be denote the average bias of independent experts. For any  2 [0;1] and any
 > 0, we have l(;;) = 1
2 + be
6 . In particular, in the pivotal state, the share of experts
endorsing candidate A is strictly increasing in be and is independent of  and .
We have made two observations (i) in typical states|those outside a -neighborhood of |the
experts' bias does not inuence the distribution of endorsements, and (ii) in the pivotal state the
experts' support of candidate A increases with their bias. Both observations are important for the
analysis of voters' behavior. Because of (i), at least when  is small, voters eectively neglect the
experts' biases when updating their beliefs based on endorsements. Because of (ii), the experts'
biases aect voters' decisions in the pivotal state. Since the equilibrium is determined by the voters'
10behavior in the pivotal state, the equilibrium outcome depends on the experts' bias even though
be is commonly known and voters correctly account for it when forming beliefs.
4.2 Voters' Behavior
Next we analyze voters' behavior. Let pv(z;;;) denote the posterior probability that a voter
assigns to candidate A winning the election after observing a signal z and a number  of endorse-
ments for A (given the threshold ). We have
pv(z;;;) =
R 
 1=2 g(z   )Pr(j)d
R 3=2
 1=2 g(z   )Pr(j)d
: (3)
The distribution of endorsements Pr(j) depends on the realized state  and on the experts'
behavior. Conditional on ,  is binomially distributed with parameters n and l(;;).
Let v(;;) 2 [0;1] denote the share of independent votes for candidate A in state  when all







As in the benchmark game,  must satisfy the condition
 = v(;;); (4)
which states that, in the pivotal state , candidate A receives exactly the right proportion
v(;;) of independent votes as to make the election result in a tie.
Due to the symmetry of the model with respect to , v(;;) is independent of . It follows
that the pivotal state is uniquely determined.
Proposition 1. The voting game has a unique monotone equilibrium.
The proof is in the appendix.
From now on we focus on the limit as  ! 0, in which experts' signals xi =  + i are much
more precise than voters' signals. In this limit, voters' posterior beliefs are relatively simple to
compute. As in the benchmark game, let v(zi;) = Pr( < jzi) denote the probability that
11candidate A wins evaluated by voter i using only her private signal zi.




v(z;) + (1   v (z;))2n 2: (5)
According to the lemma, in the limit, voters treat the experts' endorsements as informative
signals but ignore experts' incentives when evaluating these signals. In particular, the posterior
belief increases in the number  of endorsements for A, but is independent of the experts' bias be.
In the limit, two thirds of experts endorse A whenever  <  and two thirds of experts endorse
B whenever  > . Equation (5) follows from the usual Bayesian updating formula. The proof of
Lemma 3 is in the appendix.
Next we characterize the pivotal state in the limit as  ! 0+ using condition (4). Lemma 1
implies that v(zi;) is uniformly distributed on [0;1], and Lemma 2 determines the distribution of
endorsements in the pivotal state. Finally, Lemma 3 describes voters' beliefs in the limit. Combining
these lemmas yields the following proposition.
















The main results of this note follow from this proposition. First, the proposition implies that
the experts' bias be has an unambiguous eect on the pivotal state . Since the distribution
of  is increasing in be (in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance), and the posterior belief

+(1 )2n 2 is increasing in , the characterization of Proposition 2 leads to the following corollary,
which indicates that candidate A becomes more likely to win if experts' biases shift in her favor.
Corollary 1. The pivotal threshold  is strictly increasing in the experts' average bias be.
The impact of the experts' bias grows when the number n of observed endorsements becomes
large. Let (n) denote the pivotal threshold  in the limit as  ! 0+ when each voter observes
7Here B(n;p) denotes the binomial distribution for n draws with probability p.
12n endorsements. Consider limn!1 (n), corresponding to the equilibrium outcome in the ordered
limit in which rst  ! 0+ and then n ! 1. As the following corollary indicates, the outcome of
the election takes a very simple form in this limit. Unless partisan voters in favor of one candidate
form a majority, the candidate favored by experts always wins.
Corollary 2. If the experts' average bias be is positive then limn!1 (n) = 1. If the experts'
average bias be is negative then limn!1 (n) = 0.
The proof is in the appendix.
When n is large, the biases of independent voters have no eect on the election outcome, which
is determined entirely by the preferences of the independent experts. As n increases, the observed
endorsements become increasingly reliable indicators of the election outcome. Thus even a small
expert bias that slightly shifts the distribution of endorsements in the pivotal state forces the
outcome toward the experts' bias.
5 Discussion
The inuence of experts in our model results from a combination of herding and coordination. To
clarify the roles that these two features play, consider a variant of the model with no coordination
motive. Instead of the winner being determined by followers' votes, suppose that the pivotal state
 is exogenously xed; candidate A wins whenever  <  and otherwise B wins. As in the model
with coordination, the optimal endorsement chosen by an independent expert depends on her
bias only in contingencies in which she is uncertain of the outcome. Otherwise, the candidate she
endorses is exactly the ex post optimal choice for every independent voter. When experts have very
precise information about , contingencies in which they are uncertain are rare, and hence voters
eectively neglect the independent experts' biases when evaluating endorsements. Consequently,
when these contingencies arise, voting behavior depends on experts' biases. However, in the absence
of a coordination motive, the ex ante probability that expert biases aect voting behavior vanishes
as the precision of the experts' information increases.
When  is determined endogenously by voting behavior, the eect of experts' biases is multi-
plied and does not vanish if experts have precise information. Consider the eect of a shift in expert
bias in favor of candidate A. Starting from the original equilibrium value of , this shift generates
13more endorsements of A in the small neighborhood of  in which experts may be uncertain of the
election outcome. The increase in endorsements in turn leads to more votes for A in states close
to , thereby increasing the pivotal threshold. Because of the coordination motive, the increase
in the threshold leads to further endorsements and votes for A, multiplying the eect. Moreover,
no matter how small is the direct herding eect, the desire to coordinate makes the overall eect
non-vanishing.
In our model, voters know only the distribution of preferences of the experts, but do not know
the preferences of any particular expert. This assumption is natural in settings such as campaign
nance, where experts may be interpreted as donors to political campaigns, provided that the
voters observe only political advertisements without a link to individual donors. In other settings,
such as editorial bias, it may be more natural to assume that the voters have some knowledge of
the experts' political preferences. If voters have perfect knowledge of each expert's bias, then our
results do not hold. In this case, voters who observe conicting endorsements from independent
experts deduce that the state is close to the pivotal one, and are able to correct for experts' biases.
If, however, voters observe only a noisy signal of each expert's preference, then results similar
to ours continue to hold. As the experts become increasingly informed, voters again eectively
neglect those states in which the experts are uncertain about the election outcome, believing that
conicting endorsements are more likely to be the result of partisan experts. Consequently, the
outcome depends on the experts' biases.
Voters in our model have intrinsic incentives to vote for a particular candidate. This formula-
tion diers from the purely instrumental voting found in pivotal voter models, where voters have
preferences only over the outcome of the election. If voters have an incentive to vote for the winner
and the number of voters is large, instrumental voting reduces to a special case of our model. When
there are many voters, each voter assigns only negligible probability to being pivotal. Thus the
incentive to vote according to one's personal bias is completely crowded out by the incentive to
vote for the winner (see Callander (2007)). Thus if we replaced the intrinsic bias term for voters
in our model with an instrumental payo term, the model would reduce (since the population is
innite) to our model with bv = 0.
The assumption that endorsements are privately observed by voters is not essential for our
results. If instead all voters observe the same n endorsements (drawn at random from the continuum
14of experts), then the equilibrium is again unique and exhibits the same features as in the private
case. Moreover, although the equilibria in the two cases involve dierent thresholds, they converge
to the same limit as n grows large. This strongly suggests that experts can also exert inuence
over the outcome in intermediate cases where a given endorsement may be observed by many but
not all voters (as may be natural for campaign advertising or editorials in the media). Note that
drawing the public endorsements at random from a continuum precludes any signaling motive on
the part of the experts. We conjecture that incorporating such a motive would only strengthen the
inuence of experts.8
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Posterior beliefs are given by v(zi;) = 1 G(zi ) for any zi 2 [ 1=4;5=4].
If  2 [0;1], then conditional on  =  all realized signals are in [ 1=4;5=4]. Thus we have
Pr
 
v(zi;) < p j 
= Pr
 
G 1(1   p) +  < zi j 
:
In the state , zi =  + "i, and hence
Pr
 
G 1(1   p) +  < zi j 
= Pr
 
G 1(1   p) < "i






Proof of Proposition 1. We prove that the distribution of pv(zi;i;;) conditional on  does not




does not depend on  and hence the
pivotal state condition  = v(;;) has a unique solution.
Let q(i;) denote the probability that voter i observes exactly i endorsements for A when
8Proposition 7 of Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) pertains to a model closely related to a variant of
our model with one expert who has a signaling motive. In their setting, the expert exerts a large inuence over the
outcome.
15the state is  (given the experts' strategies). In the pivotal state , zi =  + "i and hence
pv(zi;i;;) =
R 
 1=2 g( + "i   )q(i;)d
R 3=2
 1=2 g( + "i   )q(i;)d
:
Using the transformation  =     and recalling that G has support on [ 1=4;1=4] gives
pv(zi;i;;) =
R 0
"i 1=4 g("i   )q(i; + )d
R "i+1=4
"i 1=4 g("i   )q(i; + )d
:
To prove that the last expression does not depend on , we show that, for each , the distri-
bution of i conditional on the state being  + does not depend on . The random variable i
is distributed according to the Binomial distribution B (n;l( + ;;)), and thus it suces to
prove that l( + ;;) does not depend on . Accordingly, note that

















































which does not depend on .
Proof of Lemma 3. For any  6= , there exists suciently small  such that in the state , all
independent experts endorse the winner of the election. Thus, for  > , lim!0+ l(;;) = 1
3
and for  < , lim!0+ l(;;) = 2
3.
The integrand in both the numerator and the denominator of (3) is bounded and hence
16pv(z;;;) converges to
R 



























Straightforward algebraic manipulation shows that the last expression is equal to the right hand
side of (5).




















i  U[0;1=3]. Note that, on the one hand, the left-hand side of the inequality in (6) converges in
probability to 1. On the other hand, since =n converges in probability to 1=2+be=6, the right-hand
side converges in probability to 2 be=3. The result follows since 2 be=3 < 1 if be > 0 and 2 be=3 > 1
if be < 0.
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